Abstract
What assistance it has received seems to have done little to modernize their military forces, enhance their national security, or publicly demonstrate the benefits of making peace. Jordan's monarch, King Hussein I, has been a staunch supporter of the United States and it's policies concerning the Middle East and has worked diligently to head off conflict and support peace in the region.
In November 1981, while addressing the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California, King Hussein acknowledged the United States' role in the Middle East peace process and continued friendship between the two countries stating that, "…over these three decades there has been one central constant factor in our relations; that is, the unbroken confidence and friendship we feel for the United States." 1 This research project will delve into several explanations of why the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has received so little U.S. military assistance, compared to other friendly regional powers, in view of its role in the Middle East peace process. Before the reasons can be explored, a historical review of the Middle East conflict since World War II will be performed to set the stage for comparing Jordan's role in the peace process with Egypt's and Israel's. Once this historical frame of reference has been established, a comparison of the U.S. military assistance provided to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan will be accomplished. The comparison will attempt to reveal the enormous imbalance in U.S.
military assistance provided to each country. I'll then present several possible explanations to account for the apparent disconnect in U.S. policy and major disparity in military assistance provided to the major players in the peace process and explore each in detail. Lastly, several recommendations will be given with respect to the U.S. policy
concerning Jordan and what the U.S. can do to assist our long time friend and ally.
Jordan has been a stabilizing force in the region and has been a staunch friend and ally to the United States. It is important to understand the historical roots of the region's conflicts and to look at several key events that have shaped the U.S. policy towards Jordan. Correcting the huge imbalance in U.S. military aid to countries in the region is essential for a stable and peaceful future and understanding the past is an essential first step.
Notes

Historical Review of the Middle East Conflict
The overall goal of U.S. defense and foreign policy since World War II has been to foster a stable, peaceful world conducive to national security, economic prosperity, and individual freedom.
-Richard F. Grimmett 
U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process
The Middle East region has a long history of tension and conflict. The attempts by various countries to enable peace in the region have been fraught with many stumbling blocks. The complex history of the region and its peoples further complicates peace initiatives. While this author can not give a complete detailed historical account of the region, a brief overview of the major events is necessary to the overall understanding of the reader.
Early History
In 722 B.C., Israel was conquered by the Assyrian King Shalmaneser and the Israelites were deported and were not allowed to return to land they originally called home until 536 B.C. Between 536 B.C. and the early 1500s, the region was in constant conflict with different rulers and religions competing for control. During the early part of the 16 th century, the entire region was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. British Palestine Mandate (1922)
Palestine remained under British control while Transjordan was to be ruled by the After the war, the Middle East maps were drastically altered (see Figure 3) . In October, Jordan and Israel signed a formal comprehensive peace treaty, bringing an end to all hostilities. 18 As one can tell from this brief history of the region, the peace between Israel, Egypt,
and Jordan was one difficult to achieve. The Palestinian issue further complicated the problems. The United States played an important role in achieving both peace agreements using its substantial diplomatic and economic instruments of power. The
Egyptian and Israeli armed forces have benefited considerably from the U.S.-provided "peace dividend". Jordan, on the other hand, comparatively has not as will be shown in the next chapter. -
U.S. State Department FY 98 Congressional Presentation
The United States has used foreign military and economic aid as an important tool of it's foreign policy since the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 was passed granting "the president extraordinary powers to sell, lend, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer virtually any item to any country whose defense he deemed vital to the security of the United States." 1 The U.S. uses its large purse to sometimes reward friendly countries and, at other times, punish countries that do not share U.S. views on a particular subject. Furthermore, military aid as a function of policy, can be used to attempt to balance a militarily imbalanced region in hopes of providing a more stable environment in the end.
Since World War II, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been one of trying to ensure stability in the region to guarantee U.S. access to the large quantities of crude oil harvested in the Persian Gulf area. In addition, as a result of domestic political pressure, the U.S. government has also provided much aid in hopes of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict or, in the least, assisting Israel with its defense, if peace failed. Lastly, the U.S.
has used its offers of aid to "win over" countries that were recipients of Soviet-backed aid during the Cold War. Once the aid is accepted, the country is converted and the U.S. becomes its sole supplier and the communist-backed supply of arms vanishes.
Over the years, many countries in the Middle East have been recipients of U.S. military aid. Our focus, however, will be limited to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan as the three major players in the Middle East peace process. 3 Since 1948, the U.S. has provided over $42 billion in military aid alone, the majority of which was non-repayable grant aid. In 1989, the U.S. administration reported that over half of Israel's defense budget was provided by the U.S. but their military expenditures still were a significant hardship on their economy, and thus, the justification for more aid being to help Israel become more secure and strong by promoting economic stability. 4 In addition to military grant aid, the U.S. has signed many agreements with
U.S. Assistance to Israel
Israel to include prepositioning U.S. military material in country, joint military exercise agreements, military research and development, and U.S. defense contract bidding.
Using the sizeable funds provided by its U.S. friends, Israel has built its military into a robust and formidable force. U.S. funds have allowed Israel to purchase state of the art, high technology U.S. weaponry that very few countries have, to include airborne early warning platforms such as the E-2C Hawkeye, precision missiles including the AGM-65
Maverick and AGM-45 Shrike, and superior fighter aircraft to include the new F-15I
Eagle. 5 As the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world, both in annual aid and cumulatively, Israel has benefited tremendously from its partnership with the U.S. As will be shown in the next section, Egypt has also benefited immensely, as well.
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
Egypt was one of the countries referred to earlier as originally being a communistsupplied country. 
Assistance Comparison
This author chose to look at the three major regional actors in the Middle East peace process for two reasons. First, to limit the scope of this research paper, and more importantly, to compare the U.S assistance provided to each of the countries that have accepted peace, signed formal agreements, and contributed to a major U.S. policy goal.
If one were to compare just raw numbers, it is easy to see the differences in aid granted. Israel has long been supported by the U.S. for military aid. The amount given each year has allowed the country to expand its military and its offensive capabilities to counter the anti-Israeli threat in the region.
During the 48 years of military assistance from the U.S., Israel's per capita gross domestic product has increased 127 percent as Israel has shifted more of its domestically sourced revenue back into their economy. 15 Egypt is second in the world only to Israel in the amount of aid received from the U.S.
Since signing the peace treaty with Israel, becoming the first Arab country to do so, the U.S. has supported their military establishment in replacing old, outdated Soviet equipment with new high-tech U.S.-built arms. Egypt, like Israel, using U.S. funding for arms purchases, has seen a 142 percent increase in gross domestic product per capita over the years of U.S. assistance. Whether comparing totals or percentages, the differences are tremendous. Figure 9 shows the percentage of aid given to each of the three countries from 1960 to 1999. It is readily apparent there is a disconnect in the amounts granted to each country. In Egypt's case, the signing of the peace agreement, brought with it a huge "peace dividend" of $1.3 billion per year. When Jordan signed in 1994, the "peace dividend" it expected did not materialize.
It is also interesting to look at what portion of each country's economy the U.S. military assistance represents. Table 1 In 1993/94, the U.S. paid for almost one third of Israel and Egypt's defense expenditures. On the other hand, the U.S. only contributed less than one percent to the total revenues of the Jordanian government and represented only one percent of its defense expenditures.
After looking at the tremendous differences in the amount of U.S. aid given, both before and after peace agreements were signed, one can easily see why Jordan could feel neglected, if not ignored, by the U.S. His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan, then next in succession to Jordan's King Hussein, said in a speech in September 1998, "there is no tangible result to show for all our patience" referring to the "peace dividends" that have not manifested after four years of peace. 22 The other major players in the peace process, Egypt and Israel, have benefited tremendously from U.S. military and economic aid and their economies are growing and healthy. Jordan, on the other hand, has a declining growth economy, unemployment that is estimated between 25 and 30 percent, and a military whose equipment is deteriorating because of lack of spares and support.
While the reasons are complex, it is important to understand what has driven U.S.
foreign policy and military aid funding for Jordan. In the following chapter, we will look at several reasons to explain the lack of a "peace dividend" and explore each in detail.
Why No "Peace Dividend"?
We If one were to visit Jordan, one would see first hand the effects of a sluggish economy, high unemployment, and a lack of highly-profitable natural resources from which to improve the overall situation. Additionally, virtually every inch of the country is bordered by past, present, or potential national security threats. To the east, Iraq; to the north, Syria; to the west, Israel; and to the south Saudi Arabia. And, although illegal drug trafficking is not prevalent in Jordan, smuggling from the bordering countries through Jordan is rampant. In many cases, the smugglers are better equipped than the Jordanian armed forces and Public Security Department assigned the mission to stop the smuggling.
Jordan's pro-Western constitutional monarchy is seen as too Western in orientation, which sometimes leads to unrest among the religious and political fundamentalists of the region. So, in short, the primary role of the Jordanian armed forces is to protect the internal security of the Kingdom of Jordan and provide for its defense.
One may ask that, since Jordan has a pro-Western, moderate, semi-democratic form of government and the monarch is held in high esteem by many American, Arab, and 
Jordan and the Camp David Accords
As previously mentioned, when 
-U.S. President Bill Clinton Letter to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
Jordan's role in the Middle East peace process has been one of constant struggle--a struggle to accommodate peace in a region where peace is not well known.
Geographically centered between ideological and religious enemies of long histories, Jordan has been influenced by economical ties, historical family bonds, and Arab nationalism --many times to its own detriment. Decisions made in the past have severely curtailed military support packages.
If one were to look at Jordan realistically, one would see a small country, torn by an internal need to stand up for its Palestinian neighbors to the west, attempting to provide a defense from its Syrian neighbors to the north, and trying to prevent an immense smuggling problem from the east and south. It is a country that has no oil resources in a region where oil is power and is forced to obtain the oil to power its economy from Iraq.
Adding to the stranglehold, close to one third of the population is unemployed. The 
Recommendations
It is inherent that the U.S. reaffirms its commitment to Jordan and peace in the Middle East. The U.S., in order to ensure our credibility abroad and with states in this volatile region, can not be lopsided in our assistance. The expected "peace dividend" must show its face for peace to be embraced by struggling countries in the region. As mentioned previously, Jordan's military is facing severe shortages. Almost all of the current FMF that Jordan receives is used to pay for the sixteen newly acquired F-16 aircraft and associated support equipment. If the U.S. hopes to maintain Jordan as an ally and stable pro-Western government, there must be action taken now to fix the problem in the near term and allow strategic planning for the long term. To accomplish this and meet the US's stated objectives of maintaining stability in the kingdom, promoting longterm economic growth, and "a comprehensive peace in the region" 2 , the U.S. will need to: increase FMF funding levels, eliminate drawdown authority 3 as a means of support, and increase economic assistance.
The amount of FMF offered to Jordan must be increased. Since the Jordan-Israel peace agreement was signed in 1994, Jordan has received less than $300 million in military assistance, most of which has been used to cover the cost of a single program. million for Jordan that would be spread over five years "to help bolster Jordan's ability to cope with regional turmoil". 7 While this is a move in the right direction, only $141 million will be targeted as military assistance 8 and it will not be enough unless it is part of a long-term comprehensive strategy to modernize the Jordanian military. This strategy should encompass the potentially destabilizing areas that concern the Jordanian government such as combating terrorism, curtailing drug/weapons smuggling activities from Iraq and Syria, and demining the fertile Jordan Valley to expand economic opportunities.
If the U.S. sincerely wants to help Jordan, an increase in FMF alone will not be enough. The last two years, the U.S. has provided Jordan with over $100 million in drawdown authority. The drawdown authority directs the Department of Defense (DoD)
to transfer assets to Jordan from their stocks. Of course, much of the transferred materiel is old, outdated, or not mission capable. The drawdown not only masks the support to Jordan but also hurts the DoD as well. This practice of transferring old equipment must stop and should be replaced with a structured long-term planning approach that replaces outdated equipment with supportable and more advanced military hardware.
The U.S. policy goal to secure a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is contingent on several factors. The U.S., as the remaining superpower, must show countries not at peace that there are benefits to be gained with peace. Secondly, the U.S.
should encourage democratic rule and free market economies and hold tight to those countries that do embrace those ideals. Lastly, the U.S. must be very careful not to further imbalance an already militarily imbalanced region and add to the instability already present.
It was not the intent of this paper to take sides or to show that Jordan is a country misunderstood by the U.S or that Jordan's past decisions were justified. The purpose was to give the reader a brief look at the complex history of the region and show that obtaining peace is not a simple task. It was also to show that U.S. military aid to the countries that have accepted peace is not equal, but in fact extremely lopsided and that Jordan, by virtue of past events and decisions, has not be benefited from the "peace dividend" as expected. If the U.S. hopes to maintain its long, positive history with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, we must jointly develop a strategy that will enhance stability and finally provide the, thus far, elusive "peace dividend".
Notes
